Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Articles

School of Food Science and Environmental
Health

2016

Human Factors Issues and the Risk of High Voltage Equipment:
Are Standards Sufficient to Ensure Safety by Design?
Maria Chiara Leva
Technological University Dublin, maria.leva@tudublin.ie

Roberta Pirani
Politecnico di Torino

Micaela de Michela
Technological University Dublin

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/schfsehart
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Leva, M.C., Pirani, R., Michela, Micaela de, & Clancy, Paul. (2012). Human factors issues and the risk of
high voltage equipment: are standards sufficient to ensure safety by design? CET:Chemical Engineering
Transactions, vol. 26, pp.273-278. doi:10.3303/CET1226046

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the School of Food Science and Environmental Health at
ARROW@TU Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU
Dublin. For more information, please contact
arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

Authors
Maria Chiara Leva, Roberta Pirani, Micaela de Michela, and Paul Clancy

This article is available at ARROW@TU Dublin: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/schfsehart/236

A publication of

CHEMICAL ENGINEERING TRANSACTIONS
VOL. 26, 2012

The Italian Association
of Chemical Engineering
Online at: www.aidic.it/cet

Guest Editors: Valerio Cozzani, Eddy De Rademaeker
Copyright © 2012, AIDIC Servizi S.r.l.,
ISBN 978-88-95608-17-4; ISSN 1974-9791

Human Factors Issues and
the Risk of High Voltage Equipment:
Are Standards Sufficient to Ensure Safety by Design?
Maria Chiara Leva*a, Roberta Piranib, Micaela De Michelab, Paul Clancyc
a

APRG School of Psychology Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Dipartimento di Chimica Politecnico di Torino, Italy
c
Asset Management ESBI Dublin Ireland
levac@tcd.ie
b

High voltage equipment is mostly designed according to technically prescriptive standards
requirements based on electrical engineering safety principles. However a more risk-based approach
to standards and regulation may be advisable to enable designer and user to take an active role in
establishing that their installation is inherently safe. The use of Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) for
instance is enabling the new substation to be housed indoors and condensed into around one quarter
of the space. The manufacturers argue that design improvements in GIS make it virtually “maintenance
free”, comply with all the relevant standards. However some of these improvements have implications
for the operators that need to be taken into account. Commissioning, operational checks and
inspections and the occasional maintenance interventions are activities during which the technicians
need to interface with the equipment, the issues regarding the interfaces provided have been analysed
to identify their relevance in the overall risk assessment of the equipment. The paper reports about a
study aimed at verifying through a risk analysis the impacts that the issues related to deficit in
ergonomic design may present for the overall availability and safety of the plant. Those issues are not
tackled in the technical standards and/or designers current practice.

1. Background of the study
Several research projects and programs on system safety engineering and Quantitative Risk Analysis
in the last 40 years offered very strong evidence of the crucial role that human and organizational
factors (HOFs) play in major accidents. According to this increasing concern toward the relevance of
HOFs in limiting safety performance considerable research effort has been spent worldwide in the last
couple of decades. This resulted in quite a rich literature covering areas from theoretical bases, to
accident investigation methods and application to major disasters, to very sophisticated modelling
approaches and techniques of HOFs in Quantitative Risk Analysis and many standards trying to
incorporate more physical aspects of Human factors like Ergonomics design. Nevertheless, many of
the models and applications described in scientific literature demonstrate very limited impact on the
technical standards applied for evaluation of safety critical equipment and procedures. The standards
used for providing requirements of High voltage equipment for instance do not take into proper account
aspects related to the human limited but by no means negligible interaction with the equipment. High
voltage equipment is mostly designed according to technically prescriptive standards requirements
based on electrical engineering safety principles (CEI IEC 62271-202, 2006). However a more riskbased approach to standards and regulation may be advisable to enable designer and user to take an
active role in establishing that their installation is inherently safe. The use of Gas Insulated Switchgear
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(GIS) for instance is enabling the new substation to be housed indoors and condensed into around one
quarter of the space. The manufacturers argue that design improvements in GIS make it virtually
“maintenance free”. However some of these improvements have implications for the operators that
need to be taken into account. A GIS more compact in fact often means having awkward stations for
the technicians during commissioning and maintenance actions that are still required to be performed.
Commissioning, operational checks and inspections and the occasional maintenance interventions are
activities during which the technicians need to interface with the equipment, the issues regarding the
interfaces provided have been analysed to identify their relevance in the overall risk assessment of the
equipment. The scope of the present study is to verify trough a risk analysis the impacts that the issues
related to deficit in ergonomic design may present for the overall availability and safety of the plant.
Issues overlooked by both the technical standards and the designers.

2. The need for risk informed design in GIS
The term switchgear, used in association with the electric power system, or grid, refers to the
combination of electrical disconnects, fuses and/or circuit breakers used to isolate electrical equipment.
Switchgear is used both to de-energize equipment to allow work to be done and to clear faults
downstream. This type of equipment is important because it is directly linked to the reliability of the
electricity supply. A safe, reliable supply of electricity depends on the circuit breakers that protect our
electricity grids in the event of short circuits. An effective although more costly form of switchgear is
gas insulated switchgear (GIS), where the conductors and contacts are insulated by pressurized
sulphur hexafluoride gas (SF6). The use of GIS rather than conventional air insulated switchgear (AIS)
is enabling the new substation to be housed indoors and condensed into around one quarter of the
space. Gas Insulated Switchgear have been gradually changed, moving towards layout that require
less and less space and often means having less space and awkward stations for the technicians
during commissioning and maintenance actions.
Figure 1 shows an overall vision of the most important components of the GIS that are involved in the
commissioning and maintenance phase. Figure 1 represents a section of the GIS system (not to scale).

Figure.1 Cross Section View of GIS
The designers and manufacturers often refer to GIS as maintenance free, however commissioning,
operational checks and inspections and the occasional maintenance interventions are activities during
which the technicians need to interface with the equipment and the issues regarding the interfaces
provided have been analysed to identify their relevance in the overall GIS risk assessment.
The study highlights clearly that good design, taking into account all potential risks, helps to ensure
safety during repair and maintenance work. It demonstrates once again the importance of taking into
account human factors at the design stage of a piece of equipment; where modifications are easier to
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carry out and less expensive than they would be once the plant is built. The end users of the machine
were actively involved throughout the whole risk assessment process and played a crucial role in
ensuring an evaluation of the conditions leading to a safe commissioning and operations of GIS.
This study was also used to evaluate whether current standards used for the design and operation of
High voltage equipment (CEI IEC 62271-202, 2006) are sufficiently taking into account the relevant
aspects of man-machine interface.
To achieve the objective, a preliminary risk assessment has been performed on an installation
complying with relevant standards (IEC 62271-202, 2006; IEC 62271-1, 2007; IEC 62271-203, 2004).

3. The use of an extended FMEA for taking into account Human Operations
The Risk Assessment was performed using an ad hoc Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
template where the functional analysis included the human tasks as well as the technical aspects.
The risk levels associated to each possible failure mode were obtained using the risk matrix proposed
by a US Military standard used for FMEA analysis (MIL-STD-882, 1993). The overall method aimed at
providing the assessment of a Risk Level similar to the Safety Integrity Level evaluation required by
standards (EN IEC 61508, 2002) (originally developed for process plants, machineries and vehicles
contain requirements and recommendations for validating safety-related electrical, electronic and
programmable control systems).
The method would start with a functional analysis of the equipment to identify all the relevant functions
to be performed by the equipment or by an operator and the connected failure modes. Some of the
failure modes can be determined assessing the Human Errors using the Technique for Human Error
Rate Prediction (THERP) developed for the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Swain and Guttman,
1983). Information about the order of magnitude of the likelihoods of the events was obtained using
equipment reliability data (when available) and THERP for relevant human errors. The severity of the
outcomes was assigned using expert judgment based on the classifications guidelines proposed in the
US military standard that provides guidelines for FMEA analysis (MIL-STD-882, 1993).
The template used identifies the man-machine functions as a starting point for the functional analysis
column. The phases of the analysis performed are:
1. Functional analysis for man and machine actions at different stages of the plant lifecycle (the only
one considered are commissioning, normal life, maintenance. Decommissioning and installation
were not considered for the purpose of the analysis)
2. Identification of the key tasks
3. Identification the failure modes for the components and error modes for the operator tasks
involved in the operation
4. Detection of causes and consequences of the human error or failure of the device involved in the
task
Table.1: Hazard severity (category are compared with the one proposed by a standard used for safety
of machinery (IEC 62061 2005)
Category
I (4)*

Name
Catastrophic

Characteristic
Death / Loss of system

II (3)

Critical

Severe injury or morbidity/ Major damage to system

III (2)

Marginal

Minor injury or morbidity/ Minor damage to system

IV (1)

Negligible

No injury or morbidity (first aid)/ No damage to system

Once the qualitative analysis was completed the next step was the evaluation of the appropriate
reliability data to be used for the quantitative assessment. For the quantification of the hazards in terms
of severity of consequences and likelihood of occurrence, we have adopted the same approach
proposed in the standard commonly used for safety of machinery (IEC 62061, 2005) with the purpose
to follow the guideline used in the field of safety of machinery for the establishment of a Safety Integrity
Level. To apply the hazard assessment matrix (Table 3) to evaluate whether the risk was unacceptable
or acceptable it was necessary to translate the numerical values, obtained from the quantitative

275

analysis, in a judgment (Tables 1 and 2). The choice of range in which likelihood and severity of
consequences fall, are in line with the guidelines proposed by a US Military standard (MIL-STD-882
1993).

Table.2: Categories of Hazard likelihood where the category given by the Military standard is aligned
with the one proposed by a standard used for safety of machinery (IEC 62061 2005)
Probability ref.
[event/y]

Category

Name

Characteristic

A (5)*

Frequent

B (4)

Probable

C (3)

Occasional

D (2)

Remote

E (1)

Improbable

Likely to occur frequently/ Occurred several times in the
last 5 years in the company.
Will
occur
several
times
in
life
of a component. Has occurred in the company.
Likely to occur sometimes in life of a component.
Has occurred more than once in the industry.
Unlikely but possible to occur in life of a component. Has
occurred in the industry. No damage to system
Occurrence may not be experienced.
Never occurred in the industry

> 10-1
10-1 to 10-3
< 10-3
< 10-4
< 10-6

Table.3: Tools to define the class of risk: Hazard Assessment Matrix and Hazard Risk Index
Frequency
of occurrence

Hazard severity

A - Frequent

I
Catastrophic
RI 1

II
Critical
RI 1

III
Marginal
RI 1

IV
Negligible
RI 3

B - Probable

RI 1

RI 1

RI 2

RI 3

C - Occasional

RI 1

RI 2

RI 2

RI 4

D - Remote

RI 2

RI 2

RI 3

RI 4

E - Improbable

RI 3

RI 3

RI 3

RI 4

The quantitative analysis required to identify the likelihood and consequences related to a variety of
events like failure mode of the electrical components, human error, “falls from ladders”, etc. and for this
reason these values have been obtained from different sources.
Failure rate of electrical device were provided by reliability data of the manufacturer or through
GESCOM data base (CESI, 2005) related to reliability of the components of the Italian electricity grid.
In this last case the value was not related to each single component but it refers to the whole system;
from the MTTF (Mean Time To Failure) it was possible to obtain the respective failure rate using the
following relation:
.
Likelihood of events like “falls from ladders” derives from expert judgment and from records of worker’s
injury reported by the company involved in the analysis.
3.1 The contribution of possible human errors and their influencing factors
The failure rate values associated to human error were obtained through the application of THERP
model (Swain and Gutman, 1983). THERP (Technique for Human error Rate Prediction) is a method to
predict human error probabilities and to evaluate the degradation of a man-machine system likely to be
caused by human errors alone or in connection with equipment functioning, operational procedures
and practices, etc.
THERP requires the analyst to determine whether the error to be examined is one of omission, one of
commission, or diagnosis and sources of operator burden include the following: a) time constraints, b)
diagnosis, c) physiological factors, etc. The data for human error probability (HEP) in THERP tables
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referred to the assumption of a lognormal distribution for the human error probability density function
(truncated in 0 and 1). In the tables two values are reported: the median of the distribution and error
factor. From this two values the mean value for the lognormal distribution is obtained to be used for
assessing the final HEP. For those ergonomic constraints that could actually prevent the job from being
effectively carried out it was assigned factor 10, for those constraints that could force the operator to
err a multiplication of a factor 5 was used. The likelihood obtained was also discounted to take into
account the actual timeframe over which certain tasks are carried out in the life period of the equipment
(e.g. commissioning is 1/ 30 years, where 30 years is the expected life duration of the equipment, and
Maintenance interventions 1/ 5 years)

4. Main findings of the assessment
The study shows that the most significant issues are:
often limited and restrictive working areas;
the technician has to work in fixed and awkward posture for sustained periods of time,
difficulty or complete inability of reading the metrological data,
slowdown in emergency procedure.
Most of these issues are ergonomic aspects and they have an important relapse on reliability of the
whole system and on the wellbeing of the operators. It seems that some basic principles of accessibility
were not properly taken into account in the design of the equipment. The lack of basic ergonomics
principle in design is reflected in the difficulties encountered by the operators to manually open or close
the circuit breakers in case of failure of automatic activation. The risk is that the worker may fail to
resolve possible critical situations in time because he/she must reach the high location and turn the
mechanism shaft while standing in an awkward position.
The results of the first step of the analysis are confirmed and supported by a survey of users of GIS
carried out by the Committee of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE, 2010).
The results provided by the quantitative analysis suggest two types of consequences. The first is
related to the underestimation of the risk associated with the loss of primary functions of the plant
normally achieved with a traditional FMEA, the failures connected to loss of efficiency, possible
disruption to customers seems to be much higher and diverse than the one normally considered in
common FMEA performed on that type of equipment (Buakaew, 2010). Once applied the hazard
assessment matrix the hazard risk index for each failure mode falls into two different classes: Risk
index 1 and Risk index 2. One is unacceptable (Risk index 1) the other risk index commonly obtained
(Risk Index 2) refers to undesirable situations where the operation is possible but awkward to perform
such that the operator may be more easily induced to make mistakes. In those cases the
consequences are severe both for the operator safety and for the plant efficiency.
Table 5 contains an extract of the results obtained for the risk Assessment of the GIS with some
examples of the failure modes leading to a risk index 1 or 2.

5. Conclusions
The analysis results confirm that the accessibility of the GIS presents different crucial aspect that the
basic standards for High voltage equipment (IEC 62271-1, 2007; IEC 62271-203, 2004 )and the
manufacturer did not take into proper account.
The technical regulation IEC related to GIS is not completely exhaustive for the aspects of detail
affecting the management of GIS. It does not provide any clear approach to do the risk analysis.
Taking into account human factors during the risk analysis the level of risk change significantly, in
some cases up to an order of magnitude going from acceptable risk to undesirable or in the worst case
to unacceptable.
The results show that more exhaustive evaluation is necessary and that the interface between the
operator and the equipment cannot be negligible.
When the risk level falls in the class unacceptable or undesirable some countermeasure is required.
To achieve useful results it could be necessary to apply some concept like “Safety Integrity Level”,
which is currently only related to machinery but probably adaptable to high voltage equipment.
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In the specific case of GIS some technical specifications exist (Terna, 2010) and gives some
interesting guidelines that could be taken into account to improve the accessibility of the bays.
The results were discussed in a review meeting with operational personnel and the safety supervisor of
the company interested in this issue. They approved and confirmed the problems highlighted by the
analysis and will use them to try and identify feasible solution with the management.
Table.5: Table reporting an extract of the FMEA performed on the GIS
id

Man-Machine function

Failure mode

Causes

Consequences

6

Visual inspections
Take counter reading if
cycles
above
10.000
perform
minor
maintenance

Operating
cycle counter
does
not
work

Operating
linkage is loose
or
defective
operating cycle
counter
is
defective
Awkward
reachability

Incorrect
maintenance

The window to
be checked and
the
ventilation
opening are not
easily
reacheable

Presence
of
moisture in the
breaker can go
undetected

6.1

6.2.1

Inspect
cabinet(free
of
damages), check heater
functions, verify ventilation
opening allow free air
movement, examine view
windows must be clear of
dust and moisture

Operator
not see
counter
Operator
to make
checks

can
the
fail
the

L

C

R

B

III

2

B

II

1

Incorrect
maintenance
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